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Abstract 
Ever since the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and a series of disasters that followed in the last decade, triggered the nations around the world to 
focus on emergency relief operations.  A well prepared and coordinated relief operation is required to reduce the vulnerability of the affected 
and bring back normalcy in the minimum possible time. The present article discusses the relief and recovery operation during the Hudhud 
cyclone that hit the coast of Bay of Bengal in October, 2014. The paper brings together the information collected through focus groups, 
personal interviews with personnel involved in the relief operations when the disaster hit the city. The article describes the different activities 
carried out at the different phases of disaster management process and concluding the different actions taken by the state to reduce the impact 
of such disasters in the future. Also, key learnings and focus areas are listed for reference in future disasters. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing number and intensity of disasters had mandated governments to focus on disaster management in the recent times. 
However, there is a need to increase humanitarian logistics service looking at the increasing number, magnitude and complexity 
of the disaster. Though the number of people killed in the disaster had come down drastically, the numbers of people affected 
had increased multifold (EMDAT1, Majewski et.al, 2010). This shows that the role of different actors in the rehabilitation, 
restoration and reconstruction is multiplied.  
One of the key performance indicators of the emergency relief is the average response time (Beamon & Blacik, 2008; Schulz 
& Heigh, 2009) therefore it is immensely important to absolutely define ‘speed’ in the humanitarian context as it often impacts 
the survival of the victims. Speed in emergency management is highly subjective to the suffering of the individuals and cannot be 
objectively defined. The humanitarian organizations have their mission statements concentrating on speed but a detail on what 
means ‘fast’ or ‘slow’ is nowhere clearly mentioned. Hence, reaching the goal of reduced response time will depend on the 
perception and intensity of the people hit by the trigger event. Also, providing rapid response following the principles of 
humanitarian logistics – humanity, neutrality, impartiality (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2004) – makes it more complex 
requiring the field workers to be ‘skilled decision makers’. But the federated organization structures and lack of bottom-up 
decision making along with the physical destruction by the disaster and the limited availability of resources obstruct the speed of 
relief support (Walton et al., 2011). 
The logistics support accounts to around 75-80% of the total costs in disaster relief (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Christopher 
&Tatham, 2011; Walton, et al., 2011) which couldn’t be met through donor contributions as they insist on spending their 
 
 
1 EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium); 
   rs. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of HumTech2016
180   Yamini Meduri /  Procedia Engineering  159 ( 2016 )  179 – 185 
donation directly to affected and not back office operations (Murray, 2005). A planned and efficient investment in logistics for 
disaster relief (Cozzolino et al. 2012) and increased efforts to gain donor trust through effective monitoring of funds’ spending 
(Scholten et al. 2010) would enable the relief organizations to perform better specially in the preparation and prevention which 
are generally neglected (Murray, 2005). 
In humanitarian aid, multiple organizations operate towards the common goal providing relief in the less possible time, and 
hence the coordination between the actors becomes more pertinent. The post disaster environment often affects the 
communication channels and transport networks impacting the average response time making the situation more complex to 
handle. In this context, the ability to communicate among the field workers and other actors plays a major role. Walton et al. 
(2011) found that ‘ongoing communication between the field requestors and logistics experts positively affected the relief and 
perception of speed’ reassuring the field workers that their efforts are helping. However, maintaining a prompt, close and clear 
communication is the key challenge given the highly dynamic situation requiring the field workers to be good in both manual and 
electronic communication. 
Depending on the intensity of the disaster, the number of players involved in the relief operation might vary involving military 
and para-military forces, donors, logistics organizations, government and non-government organizations, etc. from different 
cultures, ethnic groups, and sometimes nations with different stages of logistics experience (Cozzolino, 2012). This becomes 
even more complicated when the disaster turns into a crisis as only the host government can authorize the mobility of resources 
provided by the other countries so as to see that the relief doesn’t lead to unseen consequences. The operational objectives of 
humanitarian aid can only be achieved if all these actors efficiently coordinate with each other reducing the lead time for the 
relief to reach the vulnerable. Irrespective of the country, the military forces play a very crucial role specially the critical period 
of immediate 72 hours after the onset of the disaster. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Natural disasters in India since 1947. 
 
2. Disaster profile of India 
The 85% of the Indian sub-continent is prone to one or multiple disasters ranging from earthquake, cyclones, floods, drought 
and not to forget the Tsunami. 8% of the coast is prone to cyclone of varied intensities and is considered to be one of the worst 
cyclone affected part of the world given the ocean bed topography and coastal configuration causing casualties due to coastal 
inundation.2 Amongst the three coastal divisions (East Coast, Arabian Sea, West Coast), the eastern division experiences more 
cyclones at an approximate ratio of 4:1:13. The disaster profile of India urged the planning commission to focus on the pre-
disaster preparedness along with the response and relief phases during the 10th five year plan.4  The Planning Commission called 
for “developing capabilities at all levels, for emergency and disaster prevention and management; evolving appropriate 
management systems for emergency, disaster accident and trauma at all levels of health care” and allocated Rs. 30,000 Cr. for 
disaster management (Plan, 2002). 
 
 
 
2 http://www.saarc-sadkn.org/countries/india/disaster_profile.aspx 
3 http://www.ndma.gov.in/en/media-public-awareness/disaster/natural-disaster/cyclones.html 
4 http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/10th/volume1/10th_vol1.pdf 
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Fig. 2. Estimated damage caused by cyclones in Andhra Pradesh. 
 
3. Disaster Profile of the state of Andhra Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh (divided) has 974km long coastline most of which is prone different types of disasters ranging from cyclones, 
floods and droughts at times. 9 out of 13 districts of the state are declared to be prone to cyclones & floods while the rest are 
prone to drought. The undivided state has experienced 32 cyclone after a severe cyclone in 1977 with an average estimated loss 
at Rs. 1395.44 Cr. (Fig. 2) The magnitude of the hudhud cyclone was way beyond the one in 1977 making an estimated loss of 
Rs. 21640 Cr contributing to almost 48% of the total damage caused by the cyclones (EM-DAT). 
4. Disaster Management Process 
According to the Disaster Management Act, 2005 of India, ‘Disaster Management means a continuous and integrated process 
of planning, organizing, coordinating and implementing measures which are necessary or expedient for- 
1. Prevention of danger or threat of any disaster; 
2. Mitigation or reduction of risk of any disaster or its severity or consequences 
3. Capacity-building 
4. Preparedness to deal with any disaster 
5. Prompt response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster  
6. Assessing the severity or magnitude of effects of any disaster 
7. Evacuation, Rescue and Relief 
8. Rehabilitation and reconstruction’ 
The greatest challenge in managing a disaster is arranging and deploying all the necessary resources, reaching the disaster site 
in minimum possible time and helping the areas begin the recovery process (Day et. al., 2012). Earlier the challenges are met at 
an optimum time and cost determines the efficiency of the disaster management process.  The critical decision points that impact 
disaster relief are: 1) how to optimally deploy human resources to rescue as many survivors as possible, 2) identify, manage and 
prioritize space for relocation, 3) allocate medical personnel and other relief resources at both the demand points, 4) plan and 
manage the logistics routes to minimize fuel consumption and 5) coordinate between different organizations to maximize 
demand fulfillment (Martinez, 2010).  
The current article discusses the participation of different resources in managing the cyclone Hudhud which had hit the state 
of Andhra Pradesh, India in October 2014. The mutli-stakeholder participation in the disaster management process is discussed 
in different sections that follow here. 
5. Cyclone HUDHUD 
According to the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD), a cyclone could be categorized into five categories based on wind 
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speed: Low pressure (<31kmph), depression (31-49 kmph), deep depression (49-61kmph), cyclonic storm (61-88), severe 
cyclonic storm (88-117) & super cyclone (>221). The observed cyclone, Hudhud, was way beyond the ‘severe cyclonic storm’ 
and hence was declared a ‘very severe cyclonic storm’. IMD rightly forecasted that Hudhud would be an urban disaster with a 
landfall at the noon of 12 October 2014 over the city of Visakhapatnam with winds of 205 kmph.  
The current study attempts to understand the multi-stakeholder participation in the recovery of the urban disaster given both 
the political, economic and the psychological situation of the state. The study was carried out in two phases: information was 
collected from the different media sources, Government Orders (GO), secondary sources etc. both before and after the landfall of 
the cyclone. The second level of information was collected through focus groups, unstructured personal interviews with 
personnel who participated in the preparation, relief and recovery of the devastation caused by Hudhud Cyclone. 
 
 
Fig. 3 (left) and 4 (right). Cyclone Hudhud (Source: IMD). 
6. Preparedness Phase 
The cyclones, floods, hurricanes etc. come with an early warning and hence, a time slot to prepare for the better management 
of the disasters. The extent of efficient preparedness enables the relief organizations to restore normalcy in minimum possible 
time. The state leadership of Andhra Pradesh was proactive in responding to the signals from State-of-the-Art technology at IMD 
which perfectly predicted that it is an urban disaster providing a good five days preparation time. 
The quick first level decisions were evacuation of coastal communities, cut off power well in advance to reduce fatal 
emergencies, setting up of relief centers, mobilizing resources from state and center etc.  Hundreds of thousands of people have 
been moved to refuge in 223 relief camps. However, lack of previous experience of the magnitude of the disaster made it more 
difficult to sensitize the local population and support evacuation.  
“..at one point of time, we had to literally drag them out as they were not ready to leave their homes’ said a police officer 
during the interview. Inspite of this, 3.5 Lakh people were shifted to relief centers where access to basic amenities like water, 
food, etc. was made well before the landfall. Enough supplies of potatoes, onions were procured from neighboring states and 
kept ready. The telecom operators set up call centers in states of Andhra Pradesh and Odisha and communicated to every 
subscriber about the details through a text message. The South Central Railway cancelled trains in advance to reduce the damage 
and vulnerability of people.  The level of preparation did help in relief, recovery and restoration of the cyclone hit area.  
However, experts argue that the government failed in anticipating the magnitude of the disaster much earlier than the warning 
issued by IMD. It is evident from the United Nation’s IPCC report (Pachauri & Reisinger,2007) that the cyclones will be more 
intense in terms of peaks speed of winds creating devastation of higher magnitude. Post Tsunami experience and cyclone prone 
areas should have been rightly insulated from the destructive impact of such disasters. Once a richly vegetated Visakhapatnam 
coastline, capable of absorbing high-velocity winds, is now nowhere to be seen in the name of development. This destructive 
development and a blatant violation of environmental norms together increased the city’s vulnerability to disasters. Adding to 
these, the absence of the local leadership intensified the situation. The lack of a Commissioner to run the municipality, no regular 
Commissioner of Police almost made Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority (VUDA) almost headless (Sarma, 2014) 
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The preparation phase which generally required more of state administration’s intervention looks more positive just before the 
disaster but missed to look at the long term plan of the disaster prone area. Given the then political and economic situation of the 
state, long term disaster management plan looks to be missed out completely. 
7. Immediate Relief & Response 
HL service is unique and as per the irregular demand and unusual challenges and is observed that it frequently exceeds the 
existing capabilities (Beamon & Kotleba, 2006).  The Andhra Pradesh Government, despite of  the abnormal conditions, did 
react to the warnings from IMD and prepared itself for the disaster. The cyclone Hudhud made a landfall at noon of 12 October 
2014 with high speed of 205 kmph. in two spills. The intensity of the velocity of the winds uprooted huge trees, broken telephone 
lines & electricity towers, damaged electric poles, damaged houses, etc were found all along the city. The devastation was huge 
in the second spill compared to the first.  
According to the report of Ministry of Home Affairs, 3.3 Lakh Hectare cropped area was affected, 40,379 houses were 
damaged, 4,777 cattle heads and 61 human lives were lost. “…the decision about switching off the power supply largely affected 
the number of human lives lost…” highlighted the District Collector. 90,000 electric poles were damaged, HT lines swiped off, 
500 communication towers damaged, highways damaged and all continued to be affected until the midnight of 13 October 2014. 
Once the velocity of the winds slowed down, the different resources started relief operations. Also, 1800 private industrial units 
were damaged while in the state owned industrial park the number is around 1500 units.  
The state Police force deployed specialized platoons like 40 Octopy, 180 Greyhounds, 36 APSP for the relief operations. The 
National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) deployed 12 specialized teams for cutting the fallen trees and clearing off the 
highways for regulating vehicular traffic with relief materials. 
“..our prime motto of the relief operation was ‘Zero Casualty’ and we were ready to face the filed round the clock to being 
back normalcy in the minimum possible time” elicited the Chief Minister of state who camped in a van for eight days overseeing 
the operations. This ensured the people of the city to be brave and face the operations. The social capital structure (Nakagawa & 
Shaw, 2004) not only enabled trust and belief in the relief operations but also brought forward the local communities to facilitate 
a speedy recovery. Power supply companies deployed over 6000 employees to restore the power supply channels and the 
hundreds of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) came in to assist in the relief operations. 
A disaster of any kind attracts huge donations of money, goods, groceries etc. In an emergency, the degree of reliability of the 
source of information determines the quality and speed of public participation in the immediate response (Diwan, 2007). With 
more than 45 public departments actively involved in the emergency relief activities and with the communication channels cut 
due to the cyclone, the access for right information was far difficult increasing the vulnerability multi fold. “..the District 
Collector’s office & home, office of IMD, Police Stations all were damaged. For a while, we didn’t know how to react or where 
to go first” recalls a police officer who was on duty for straight six days at the time of disaster. 
As in any emergency, troubling activities like theft, illegal hike in prices of commodities etc were seen rampant in the 
immediate response phase. In such high pressure situation, the police could control a fire accident in the dumping yard, milk and 
water which were priced multi-fold was controlled by the Government intervention making it freely available to all the citizens 
till the state achieved normalcy.  
The preparation and quick response could reduce the loss of lives but the damage caused was extensive. In relation to this, the 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) with the intervention from the Chief Minister of the State issued a 
notice to all the CEOs of the insurance companies on 16th October 2014, for timely settlement of insurance claims of the people 
affected in Andhra Pradesh & Odisha. To facilitate this, all necessary communication channels, toll free number, email id, 
contact people, local offices etc. were dedicated by all the insurance organizations. 
This way, the governments, both state and center, coordinated with various departments within, other voluntary organizations 
effectively face the emergency and reduce the vulnerability of the people of the affected areas. 
8. Recovery & Rehabilitation phase 
Students, volunteers from various NGOs, local communities, and many more participated in clearing debris, removal of fallen 
trees, setting up communication towers, etc. Most of all, the multi-stakeholder participation facilitated in recovering back to 
normalcy in record 8 days after a massively destructive ‘very severe cyclone’ hit the city of Visakhapatnam. 
The Prime Minister, Mr. Narendra Modi, visited the disaster stuck region just 2 days after the landfall and announced Rs. 
1000Cr. as an immediate assistance from the Center. The Chief Ministers of the different states also extended help both 
financially and non-financially. Some states supplied immediate resources while some shared electricity while the rest sent in 
funds. Businessmen, Actors from the cinema industry etc. extended helping hands for the place to recover. After attaining 
normalcy in a record time, the major challenge was in complete recovery and reconstruction of the region. 
The state leadership organized a video conference with people from different localities through local public sectors to 
understand the extent of the relief. The process throughout clarified not only about the relief but also laid ground for future plans. 
All plans to grow thick mangroves, plamyra trees are in place and the work started already along the entire coastline of the state. 
Strict municipal laws are enforces to restrict the digging of borewells below 500m., this would otherwise increase the salination 
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of the ground water making it unavailable during emergencies as an alternative source of water when the drinking water facilities 
get affected. Also laws on water harvesting, water recycling, avoid encroachment of natural water bodies etc. are at the primary 
enforcement level. The urban destruction and deforestation caused in the name of development should be curbed and alternative 
plans should be made to reduce the carbon footprint and increase the green cover of the coast. 
Since in every emergency the role of communication channels plays a very crucial role and is always affected, the state 
government mandated the construction of underground ducts for cables which wouldn’t be disturbed during the disasters. It is 
now mandated to nominate warehouses for inventory of JCBs, trucks, power saws for easy and speedy recovery. Capacity 
building for police and local communities on basic reading ability of the satellite images is conducted so as to let them 
understand the magnitude and intensity of disasters.  
The District Collector also opined to create processes within the public departments that shall facilitate faster decision making 
and speed up the recovery process. An inventory of hand held sets connecting the different departments involved, utilizing the 
satellite bandwidth, removal of hoardings and banners well in advance are all mandated by the state for providing better relief. 
With all the necessary actions taken, the city of Visakhapatnam is completely recovered and is working towards building a 
disaster resilient city. 
9. Lessons learned & guidelines of future 
Effective management of Hudhud cyclone looks short lived when the huge floods in Chennai were not managed as effectively 
as it was expected. Also, when we look at the different disasters handled, the supply chain of information and process is so weak 
that often the lessons learnt are lost in the transition. When leadership and understanding of the town planning of Visakhapatnam 
helped in the disaster recovery, the lack of the same resulted in the city of Chennai to remain drowned for weeks together and an 
estimate of 2 years to bring the city back to normalcy.  
To ease the knowledge flow in the organization, here is a list of lessons learnt and can be implemented in disaster prone 
regions for effective disaster management process. 
1. Proactive state leadership: What worked in Visakhapatnam and what did not in Chennai was the hands-on availability 
of the leadership at every level. The stay on board of chief minister of the Andhra Pradesh, Mr. N Chandra Babu Naidu, 
definitely supported the people of the place. The emotional support enabled people to stay strong during their tough 
times and in-turn helped in recovery process. 
2. Proper planning: Disaster recovery was possible with visible effectiveness due to the planning done ahead of the 
landfall. The people of the place were made aware of the intensity of the cyclone, communication help-lines were set 
up, food supplies were kept ready. A plan of action with all the stakeholders taken into consideration would definitely 
help the communities face the disaster better. 
3. Knowledge of the geography: It is vital to have a good understanding of the geography of the disaster hit area for 
deciding the right way of action. Having the right knowledge of the water bodies, catchment areas, town planning, 
landfills etc. of the city of Chennai, would have helped the process of management better. Hudhud disaster in a way had 
a better understanding of the geography of the place which was visible at every phase of recovery process. 
4. Expect the unexpected: It is vital for any emergency management organization to expect the unexpected and be ready 
to face the disaster. In both the cases, the pre-monsoon planning was not in the right place. Effective disaster 
management should start atleast 6-months in advance and the possible emergencies should be anticipated to keep the 
plan of action ready. 
5. Awareness: The stakeholder participation in the recovery phase did make a lot of difference in the way the two recent 
major disasters in India were handled. Creation of awareness amongst the communities of disaster prone areas is very 
important in any emergency management.  
6. Service orientation: Every disaster so far has attracted a lot of civilians contribute to the recovery process. A natural 
phenomenon of inculcating service orientation in every individual should be encouraged. This could be instilled making 
it mandatorily part of the education system and parenting process which will enable citizens of every nation be oriented 
and committed to serve the people in need. 
7. Supply chain of information: A national & international repository of the lessons learnt from each disaster should be 
made publicly available so that a mistake once committed is not repeated in the next calamity. 
These could be major areas that every nation should mandatorily focus and develop on so that handling a disaster becomes 
easier process than expected. 
10. Conclusion 
Exponentially increasing number of disaster mandate every stakeholder to be better prepared to face an event of any 
magnitude with all force. The cyclone Hudhud hit the coastal city of Visakhapatnam and devastated numerous lives into 
darkness. But the multi stakeholder participation under the dynamic leadership of the state brought back normalcy in record time. 
This was possible with the trust and strength of the affected citizens who not only withstood the landfall of the very severe 
cyclone but also came forward to help in the relief operations. The well-coordinated efforts of different departments of the 
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government and the different organizations, makes the relief one of its kind in the history of natural disasters that hit the country 
over the last few decades. 
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